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COMPUTER SOURCE CODE: A SOURCE OF THE





We [are] . . . increasingly . . . governed by source code . . . .  If we do
not recognise that our . . . processes and procedures . . . are gradu-
ally becoming source code, then we risk a technological tyranny.1
–Professor Mark Harman, Department of Computer
Science, University College London2
Courts throughout the world are increasingly relying on expert tes-
timony, notably scientific evidence, to resolve legal disputes.  One
Rand Corporation study of over 500 American trials found that ex-
perts presented testimony at eighty-six percent of trials.3  One com-
mentator has suggested that in the United States, trial by jury is
evolving into trial by expert.4
In the early 20th century, the normal pattern was that an individual
expert would personally conduct by hand a single test such as a drug
identification procedure.  Early forensic tests were labor-intensive and
sometimes slow.  Today, a forensic scientist witness often does not ap-
pear at trial to describe a manual scientific analysis.  Rather, the wit-
ness will testify about the results of an automated forensic technique
that he or she oversaw.  In a drunk driving case, the witness is rarely a
* Edward L. Barrett, Jr. Professor of Law Emeritus, University of California, Davis School of
Law; former chair, Evidence Section, American Association of Law Schools; coauthor, PAUL C.
GIANNELLI, EDWARD IMWINKELRIED, ANDREA ROTH & JANE CAMPBELL MORIARTY, SCIEN-
TIFIC EVIDENCE (5th ed. 2012).  A version of this Article was presented at the Second Interna-
tional Symposium on Sino Swiss Evidence Science at the University of Lausanne, Switzerland on
September 6–9, 2016.
1. Mark Harman, Why Source Code Analysis and Manipulation Will Always Be Important,
TENTH IEEE INT’L WORKING CONFERENCE ON SOURCE CODE ANALYSIS & MANIPULATION,
Sept. 12–13, 2010, at 7, http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/amp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=5601835.
2. Mark Harman, Professor of Software Engineering, University College London, http://www
0.cs.ucl.ac.uk/staff/mharman/.
3. Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1113, 1119 (1991) (discussing results
derived from civil trials in California in 1985 and 1986).
4. William T. Pizzi, Expert Testimony in the US, 145 NEW L.J. 82, 82 (1995) (describing how
experts are “readily availab[le]” to testify in favor of each party).
97
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toxicologist testifying about a manual oxidative analysis of the alcohol
concentration in a blood sample that he or she personally drew from
the suspect.5  It is far more likely that the witness will be a police
officer trained to use an Intoxilyzer that samples the suspect’s breath
and contains a computer program that reads out an estimate of the
suspect’s breath alcohol concentration.6  In a rape case, the witness
may not be a DNA analyst who personally analyzed the vaginal swab
from the victim of a gang rape and opines as to the DNA profile of all
the contributors to the mixed sample.  Eighty-five percent of DNA
laboratories in the United States use automated techniques, such as
Applied Biosystems instrumentation,7 to conduct the initial analysis to
identify the DNA profiles in a sample.8  Assume the results of this
initial stage of the analysis indicate that there were multiple contribu-
tors with varying profiles to the genetic sample.  On that assumption,
the witness may testify to the result when he or she used Cybergenet-
ics’ TrueAllele computer program, which applies probabilistic ge-
notyping9 to generate a statistic as to whether a particular defendant
was one of the contributors.10  To enhance uniformity of analysis and
partially to increase the volume of analyses that a laboratory can con-
duct,11 there is a growing trend to automate—that is, computerized
forensic analysis.
The “heart” of any computer program is its source code.12  The
source code contains all the instructions that the program needs to
execute its tasks.  Some have described DNA as the biological source
code for life.13  By way of analogy, one commentator has said that the
5. See 2 PAUL C. GIANNELLI ET AL., SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 20.04[b] (5th ed. 2012) (“[A]
1999 survey conducted by the College of American Pathologists revealed that [the oxidative]
method is rarely used today.”).
6. See id. § 22.03[b][1] (describing the Intoxilyzer testing process).
7. Id. § 18.03[d].
8. William C. Thompson & Dan E. Krane, DNA in the Courtroom, in PSYCHOLOGICAL &
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL TRIALS § 11:23 (2003).
9. See 2 GIANNELLI ET AL., supra note 5, at 83–87, for a general description of the com- R
puter–based, probabilistic genotyping approach to analyzing mixed DNA samples.
10. TrueAllele is not the only program relying on probabilistic genotyping.  STRMix and Fo-
rensic Statistical Tool (FST) are also such programs. See People v. Muhammad, No. 14-65263-
FC, at *2 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Dec. 15, 2015), http://media.mlive.com/chronicle/news_impact/other/
muhammad-opinion.pdf (discussing STRmix).
11. Jim Dawson, Fighting Crime with Science, NAT’L INST. JUST. J., Dec. 2015, at 10 (noting
that forensic laboratories are dealing with “a never-ending flow of evidence,” and that “the de-
mands on crime laboratories to process evidence faster while lowering costs have increased dra-
matically over the past decade”).
12. Christopher M. Mislow, Protecting Source Code from Disclosure During Pretrial Discov-
ery, 12 UTAH B.J. 39, 47 (1984).
13. Harman, supra note 1, at 10. R
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source code is the “lifeblood” of a computer program.14  The accuracy
of the source code is the most fundamental guarantee of the pro-
gram’s proper operation.15  The code dictates which tasks a computer
program performs, how the program performs the tasks, and the order
in which the program performs the tasks.16
At first blush, given the fundamental importance of a computer pro-
gram’s software, one would think that when a question arose as to
whether the software was operating correctly, the courts would de-
mand a showing of the validity of the code or at least allow a litigant
challenging the program to examine the code itself.  Courts in the
United States frequently allow civil litigants to perform such an exam-
ination.  On the civil side, it is something of an aberration for a court
to refuse to permit a civil litigant challenging the performance of a
computer program to have an independent expert study the code.17
In many civil disputes, such as the highly publicized controversy over
the Volkswagen computer program allegedly designed to defeat emis-
sions testing,18 the content of the computer’s code is directly relevant.
In the Volkswagen case, the central question was whether the com-
pany wrote code that was intended to mislead emission tests.
In the criminal setting, the content of computer code ordinarily has
merely circumstantial relevance; the code is relevant only to the relia-
bility of a scientific instrument that in turn has been used to generate
evidence of a disputed fact against the accused.  As a general proposi-
tion, in the United States, criminal discovery is more limited than civil
discovery.19  More specifically, criminal courts have taken a very dif-
14. Jorge R. Roig, Decoding First Amendment Coverage of Computer Source Code in the Age
of Youtube, Facebook, and the Arab Spring, 68 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 319, 395 (2012); see
DOUGLAS R. HOFSTADTER, GODEL, ESCHER, BACH: AN ETERNAL GOLDEN BRAID 290–91
(1979).
15. Ryan Christopher Fox, Comment, Old Law and New Technology: The Problem of Com-
puter Code and the First Amendment, 49 UCLA L. REV. 871, 873 (2002).
16. See generally Harman, supra note 1. R
17. Mislow, supra note 12, at 47 (comparing several cases in which the court allowed the R
litigant to access and examine the code with Hubco Data Products Corp. v. Mgmt. Assistance,
Inc., No. 81-1295, 1983 WL 1130, at *3 (D. Idaho Feb. 3, 1983) (Memorandum Decision denying
motion to compel production of documents)).
18. Guilbert Gates et al., Explaining Volkswagen’s Emissions Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (July 19,
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/business/international/vw-diesel-emissions-
scandalexplained.html?_r=0; Russell Hotten, Volkswagen: The Scandal Explained, BBC (Dec.
10, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-34324772.  If a corporation hires a computer com-
pany to design software to control some of its business or industrial operations and the corpora-
tion believes that the software does not function properly, the corporation may sue the company
for breach of warranty.  The corporation’s complaint will contain express allegations about the
software, making the contents of the program directly relevant.
19. 1 GIANNELLI ET AL., SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 3.01 (5th ed. 2012).  On its face, Civil Rule
26 purports to authorize much broader discovery than Criminal Rule 16.  Civil Rule 26 allows for
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ferent approach to source code discovery.  There have been two pri-
mary waves of criminal cases raising the issue.20  The first wave
crested in the early 2000s.  During that period, the issue was access to
the source code of the software programs for computerized infrared
breath testing devices.  With few exceptions,21 the clear majority of
courts rejected defendants’ requests that a defense expert be granted
access to the program’s source code.22  The second wave is occurring
now.  Today, the issue presented is gaining access to the source code
for a probabilistic genotyping computer program, such as TrueAllele,
that generates statistics for the DNA profiles of potential contributors
to mixed DNA samples—perhaps the most daunting challenge for a
DNA laboratory.23  To date, TrueAllele has been used in approxi-
discovery of “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense,” while
Criminal Rule 16 only allows discovery of certain types of evidence. Compare FED. R. CIV. P.
26, with FED. R. CRIM. P. 16.
20. There have been isolated source code cases that have not involved either breath testing
devices or the TrueAllele DNA program.  One such case was United States v. Chiaradio, 684
F.3d 265, 276–77 (1st Cir. 2012).  Chiaradio was charged with possession and distribution of child
pornography. Id. at 265.  A government expert used an enhanced peer-to-peer file-sharing pro-
gram (EP2P) to download files and facilitate the identification of files containing child pornogra-
phy.  The defense claimed that the EP2P technology had not been sufficiently tested. Id. at
276–77.  The court held that the government’s foundation was adequate even though the pro-
gram’s source code had not been peer reviewed. Id.  Although there are isolated decisions such
as Chiaradio, the vast majority of the published criminal cases relating to source code deal with
either breath testing devices or probabilistic genotyping programs such as TrueAllele. See also
United States v. Matish, No. 16-cv-16, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82279 (E.D. Va. June 23, 2016)
(challenging the source code for the full network investigative technique employed in child por-
nography cases to examine a suspect’s computer).
21. See State v. Bjorkland, 924 So. 2d 971, 973 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); State v. Underdahl,
767 N.W.2d 677, 683–84 (Minn. 2009); In re Comm’r of Public Safety, 735 N.W.2d 706, 712–13
(Minn. 2007); State v. Chun, 923 A.2d 226, 226–27 (N.J. 2007), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 825 (2008).
22. See, e.g., Moe v. State, 944 So. 2d 1096, 1097 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); State v. Underdahl,
749 N.W.2d 117, 120–21 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 767 N.W.2d 677
(Minn. 2009) (affirming the district court’s denial of production of computer code); State v.
Burnell, No. MV06479034S, 2007 WL 241230, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 18, 2007); State v.
Walters, No. DBDMV050340997S, 2006 WL 785393, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 15, 2006);
People v. Cialino, 831 N.Y.S.2d 680, 681–82 (Crim. Ct. 2007).
23. Katherine L. Moss, Note, The Admissibility of TrueAllele: A Computerized DNA Interpre-
tation System, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1033, 1060–62 (2015) (“The TrueAllele computer pro-
gram relies on a form of statistical analysis called probabilistic genotyping.  Probabilistic
genotyping involves applying the information derived from DNA profiles to complex mathemat-
ical formulas known as algorithms.  The algorithms compare different statistical models to the
actual data and weigh the probability that the model matches the data . . . .  Specifically, TrueAl-
lele relies on a class of algorithms derived from a Bayesian statistical analysis called Monte
Carlo-Markov Chain (MCMC) modeling.  The MCMC statistical approach has been used in a
variety of situations to successfully model many complex data sets.”).  The developer of TrueAl-
lele, Dr. Mark Perlin, claims that TrueAllele yields more reliable statistics in DNA mixture cases
than previously employed approaches. See Mark Perlin, Inclusion Probability for DNA Mixtures
Is a Subjective One-Sided Match Statistic Unrelated to Identification Information, J. PATHOLOGY
INFORMATICS (Oct. 28, 2015), http://www.jpathinformatics.org/article.asp?issn=2153-3539;year=;
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mately 500 cases.24  As in cases involving infrared breath testing de-
vices, defendants throughout the country have sought to discover
TrueAllele’s source code in order to have the code evaluated by de-
fense experts.25  The courts’ responses to requests for the source code
of TrueAllele has been even more uniformly negative than the previ-
ous requests for access to the source codes of infrared breath testing
instruments.26  In fact, “[c]ourts in at least seven states” have rebuffed
defendants’ requests.27
This Article argues that although the prosecution may lay the foun-
dation for admitting testimony based on probabilistic genotyping pro-
grams, such as TrueAllele, without presenting expert testimony about
the program’s source code, in some circumstances a criminal accused
should have the right to access to the program’s source code to assess
its validity.  Part II of this Article explains the concept of computer
source code28 and reviews the multi-step process that leads to the cre-
ation of such code.  Part III of the Article describes the prior case law
admitting testimony based on such programs while denying the de-
volume=;issue=;spage=;epage=;aulast=Perlin (criticizing the use of the combined probability of
inclusion (CPI), employed “by crime labs for over 15 years”); see also Seth Augenstein, DNA
Mixture Calculation Method Just ‘Random Number Generator,’ Says New Study, FORENSIC MAG.
(Nov. 16, 2015, 12:50 PM), http://www.forensicmag.com/article/2015/11/dna-mixture-calcula
tion—’random-number-generator’-says-new-study (describing the unreliable nature of DNA
testing in laboratories).  In PRES. COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT – FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF
FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS (2016), the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and
Technology is sharply critical of the subjective methods used in the past to analyze complex
DNA mixtures.  The Council asserts that the approach used in the past “has been an inade-
quately specified—and thus inappropriately subjective—method. As such, the method is clearly
not foundationally valid.” See id. at 78. There are at least eight probabilistic genotyping pro-
grams, including TrueAllele, STRmix, and FST. Id.
24. Augenstein, DNA Mixture, supra note 23. R
25. E.g., Paula Reed Ward, Judge to Allow DNA Evidence in Deaths of Wolfe Sisters, PITT.
POST-GAZETTE (Oct. 30, 2015, 12:00 AM), http://www.post-gazette.com/local/city/2015/10/30/
Judge-to-allow-DNA-evidence-in-deaths-of-East-Liberty-Wolfe-sisters/stories/201510300182
(“[A]ttorneys have asked Common Pleas Judge Jill E. Rangos to require TrueAllele’s creator,
Dr. Mark Perlin, to release his source code so they can independently verify his results.”).
26. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Robinson, No. CC 201307777 (Pa. Ct. C.P. Allegeheny Cty.
Feb. 4, 2016) (discussing the admissibility of test results without disclosing source code in previ-
ous trials).
27. Joe Palazzolo, Judge Denies Access to Source Code for DNA Software Used in Criminal
Cases, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 5, 2016, 10:56 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2016/02/05/judge-denies-
access-to-source-code-for-dna-software-used-in-criminal-cases/ (discussing the recent ruling of
Judge Jill Rangos in a prosecution of Michael Robinson in Pennsylvania); Jonathan D. Silver,
Stay, Immediate Appeal Sought for Attorneys Seeking Access to DNA Analysis Software, PITT.
POST-GAZETTE (Jan. 5, 2016, 10:25 PM), http://www.post-gazette.com//city//01/05/-DNA-analysis
-software-in-potential-capital-case-ask-for-stay-immediate-appeal/stories/201601050217.
28. See infra notes 34–73 and accompanying text. R
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fense access to the program’s source code.29  In particular, this Part
reviews the infrared breath testing devices cases and decisions on
TrueAllele.
While Parts II and III of the Article are descriptive, Part IV
presents a critical evaluation of the issues.  Initially, this Part ad-
dresses the question of whether the prosecution should be permitted
to introduce expert testimony based on a computerized technique
without presenting foundational testimony about the validity of the
program’s source code.30  This Part concludes that the prosecution
may do so.  Part IV then turns to the issue of whether there are cir-
cumstances in which the defense ought to have access to the source
code.31  This Part considers both the defense’s alleged need for access
and the manufacturer’s countervailing interest in shielding a source
code, which is often a valuable trade secret.  Part IV argues that when
the available validation studies for the program omit a condition that
(1) is present in the pending case and (2) could materially affect the
performance of the program, the defense should have a limited right
of access.32  Part IV concludes by proposing a specific procedure that
trial judges can employ in deciding whether and how to grant defend-
ants access.33
II. AN EXPLANATION OF COMPUTER SOURCE CODE
Computer code is an enormous, complex topic.34  This Part of the
Article presents a brief, simplified overview of the process.  The over-
view explains why the focal point of the controversy over TrueAllele is
the program’s source code rather than any other aspect of the
program.
A. The General Concept of Source Code
Source code dictates which tasks a program performs, how the pro-
gram performs the tasks, and the sequence in which the program per-
forms the tasks.  A computer accomplishes tasks35 by executing36 the
29. See infra notes 74–107 and accompanying text. R
30. See infra notes 108–54 and accompanying text. R
31. See infra notes 155–99 and accompanying text. R
32. See infra notes 200–28 and accompanying text. R
33. See infra notes 229–35 and accompanying text. R
34. See JAMES GRIMMELMANN, INTERNET LAW: CASES & PROBLEMS 25 (6th ed. 2016) (“There
are thousands of programing languages.”).
35. See Trevor J. Foster & Seth A. Northrop, A Lawyer’s Guide to Source Code Discovery,
FED. L., Feb. 2011, at 42.
36. Harman, supra note 1, at 8–9. R
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orders contained in the code;37 simply stated, the program operates by
carrying out those orders.38  The orders take the form of algorithms
embedded in the code.39
B. The Multi-Step Process of Creating Source Code
The process begins when an employee or team of employees devel-
ops the concept for marketing a product to perform a particular task.
The starting point is producing a document specifying the marketing
requirements—the functions that the company will eventually adver-
tise the product as performing.40
The marketing team passes this document on to the programming
group members, who attempt to identify the technical requirements
for the product.41  The group formulates a general design including a
functional flow that will enable the user to employ the product to per-
form all tasks identified by the marketing team.42
Next, the group converts the general design concept into a more
detailed specification document.43  In this phase, the group begins de-
veloping a deeper, more comprehensive understanding of everything
that the program must contain in order to perform the tasks identified
by the marketing team.44
Now the work of the codewriters45 starts in earnest.  Initially, they
must choose a language in which to write the code.  Over the decades
codewriters have developed and used a large number of codes, includ-
ing BASIC, C, C++, COBOL, Fortran, Java, HTML, LISP, PHP, Perl,
Python, and XML.46  Some languages are particularly well suited for
business uses while others are more appropriate for capturing formal
mathematical principles in research and academia.47
37. Id. at 9.
38. See, e.g., Campbell v. Facebook Inc., 310 F.R.D. 439, 448 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (describing how
Facebook source code carries out processes).
39. Roig, supra note 14, at 327. R





45. Id. at 44.
46. Roig, supra note 14, at 327; see Fox, supra note 15, at 877–78; Mislow, supra note 12, at 39. R
The Mislow article was written over three decades ago and it remains one of the clearest exposi-
tions in print of the programming process.
47. Fox, supra note 15, at 877–78. R
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The programmers begin writing the source code in the selected lan-
guage.48  A programmer familiar with the particular language can
both read and write source code.49  The source code itself is a combi-
nation of words and mathematical symbols50 that have a particular
meaning in the selected language.51  The original programmer writes
the program logic into the code,52 and other programmers literate in
the same language can follow the complete logical pathway of the pro-
gram at a later time.53
At this point in the process, the programmers should test the source
code.  Although the code has not yet been finalized and converted
into machine code, the codewriters can use specialized development
tools such as a “debugger” to conduct some limited testing to deter-
mine whether the instructions embedded in the source code suffice to
accomplish the specified tasks.54  If the source code passes muster in
the testing, it is ready to be converted into machine or object code.
The source code must be distinguished from the machine or object
code.55  The latter code is binary56—a series of 1’s and 0’s57—that
would strike most persons, including most programmers, as meaning-
less.58  To be sure, there are some “super geeks” who can read and
write binary code.59  To write machine code, a programmer must em-
ploy a high-level assembly language rather than one of the languages
previously mentioned.60
The manual writing of machine code is both tedious and error
prone.61  Consequently, in most cases, the programmers resort to a
device called a compiler62 to convert63 or transform64 the source code
48. People v. Robinson, 860 N.Y.S.2d 159, 163 (App. Div. 2008) (describing source code as
text “written onto a computer chip”).
49. Foster & Northrop, supra note 35, at 43; Roig, supra note 14, at 327. R
50. Fox, supra note 15, at 877; see GRIMMELMANN, supra note 34, at 24–25 (providing exam- R
ples of simple source code in Python and C, two different programming languages).
51. GRIMMELMANN, supra note 34, at 24–25. R
52. Foster & Northrop, supra note 35, at 45; see Mislow, supra note 12, at 46–47. R
53. Foster & Northrop, supra note 35, at 45. R
54. Id. at 43.
55. See GRIMMELMAN, supra note 34, at 24–26. R
56. Mislow, supra note 12, at 39. R
57. Id.
58. Fox, supra note 15, at 880.  Some commentators have asserted that machine language is R
virtually unreadable.  Pamela Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Pro-
tection for Computer Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 1984 DUKE L.J. 663, 679 (1984)
(analogizing a computer operating system to a secretary’s familiarity with an office filing
system).
59. Foster & Northrop, supra note 35, at 43. R
60. Fox, supra note 15, at 880. R
61. Id.
62. Id.
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into binary machine code.65  In effect, the compiler translates the
source code into machine or object code.66  After that step, the source
code’s instructions are in a form that is directly executable by a com-
puter.67  The machine code can be run directly through the computer’s
processor in order to perform the tasks initially identified by the mar-
keting personnel.68
It should be evident why defendants challenging a software pro-
gram prefer access to the source code as opposed to the machine or
object code.  Like the machine code, the source code contains all the
instructions embedded in the program.69  Unlike machine code, the
source code is human readable by many programmers.70  A source
code is much more likely to be intelligible to a defense expert.71  Fur-
thermore, there are commercially available tools such as Grep and
Understand 2.0 that the programmer can use in evaluating source
code.72  Defendants are much more likely to find an expert capable of
critically evaluating that type of computer code if they can gain access
to the source code.73
III. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW GOVERNING ADMISSIBILITY OF
TESTIMONY BASED ON COMPUTERIZED FORENSIC SCIENCE
TECHNIQUES AND THE DISCOVERABILITY OF THE
COMPUTER PROGRAM SOURCE CODE
Most criminal cases raising source code issues have involved either
breath testing devices or DNA probabilistic genotyping programs such
as TrueAllele.  A handful of criminal cases have addressed source
code issues in other settings,74 but those cases are few and far be-
63. Foster & Northrop, supra note 34, at 43. R
64. Roig, supra note 14, at 327 (discussing how source code translated from readable form R
into object code).
65. Mislow, supra note 12, at 39. R
66. Roig, supra note 14, at 327. R
67. Fox, supra note 15, at 873 (discussing computer instructions); Object Code, TECHNOPEDIA, R
https://technopedia.com/definition/546/object-code (last visited Aug. 9, 2016).
68. Fox, supra note 15, at 880. R
69. Roig, supra note 14, at 327. R
70. Foster & Northrop, supra note 35, at 43. R
71. Id. at 45.
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., People v. Robinson, 860 N.Y.S.2d 159, 167 (App. Div. 2008) (stating that the
defendant failed to present evidence that the source code could be downloaded and analyzed
from the device in an intelligible language).
74. See, e.g., United States v. Chiaradio, 684 F.3d 265, 271 (1st Cir. 2012) (discussing the
F.B.I.’s use of the EP2P enhanced peer-to-peer file-sharing program in a child pornography
prosecution); United States v. Matish, No. 16-cv-162016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82279 (E.D. Va. June
23, 2016).
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tween.  For that reason, this Part concentrates on breath-testing-de-
vice decisions and the TrueAllele case law.
A. The Admissibility of Prosecution Testimony Based on
Automated Forensic Techniques
This Part reviews the legal framework to determine the admissibil-
ity of prosecution expert testimony based on the infrared breathing
and the TrueAllele techniques.
1. Infrared Breath Testing Techniques
There have been two major waves of case law, the first dealing with
testimony about infrared breath testing devices in drunk driving cases.
In some jurisdictions, when the prosecution offers such testimony, the
prosecution can invoke a statute that purports to eliminate the need
for foundational testimony establishing the reliability of the tech-
nique.75  Minnesota and New York are illustrative.
In Minnesota, prosecutors had the benefit of the following state
statute:
In any civil or criminal hearing or trial, the results of a breath test,
when performed by a person who has been fully trained in the use
of an infrared or other approved breath-testing instrument, . . . pur-
suant to training given or approved by the commissioner of public
safety or the commissioner’s acting agent, are admissible in evi-
dence without antecedent expert testimony that an infrared or other
approved breath-testing instrument provides a trustworthy and reli-
able measure of the alcohol in the breath.76
Even though courts are the government bodies that use evidentiary
rules on a daily basis, state constitutions of most jurisdictions give the
legislature the plenary power to prescribe evidentiary rules for the
courts.77  Hence, while the prosecution must ordinarily lay a founda-
tion showing the reliability of a scientific technique employed by one
of its witnesses,78 the legislature can provide that in specified situa-
tions the prosecution need not present such testimony.  In the words
of the Minnesota statute, the prosecution may introduce testimony
about the result of a breath testing device “without antecedent expert
75. In re Comm’r of Public Safety, 735 N.W.2d 706, 710 (Minn. 2007).
76. MINN. STAT. § 634.16 (2015).
77. Paul C. Giannelli, The Proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence: The General Assembly, Evi-
dence, and Rulemaking, 29 CASE WES. RES. L. REV. 16, 24–25 (1978). But see Brim v. State, 624
N.E.2d 27, 33 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (striking down an evidentiary statute because the statute
“conflict[ed] with the rule adopted in” an Indiana Supreme Court decision).
78. See 1 GIANNELLI ET AL., supra note 19, § 1.12 (describing the process for laying the foun- R
dation for a proper scientific technique).
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testimony that” the instrument is “reliable” so long as: (1) the person
who conducted the test complied with the administrative training re-
quirements; and (2) that person used a testing device approved by the
Commissioner of Public Safety.79  Pursuant to the statute, the Minne-
sota Commissioner of Public Safety promulgated a list of approved
breath testing devices, which are presumed reliable.80  A defendant
must rebut this presumption by establishing “reason to doubt the ac-
curacy and reliability of the test results.”81  The published Minnesota
opinions involve a product manufactured by a Kentucky corporation
CMI, Inc., the Intoxilyzer 5000EN, an infrared device on Minnesota’s
approved list.82
The state of the law in New York is very similar.  Like Minnesota,
New York maintains a list of approved breath testing devices, devel-
oped by the New York State Department of Health.83  At the time of
the New York litigation, the list included a reference to “the Intox-
ilyzer 5000.”84  However, as the New York courts acknowledged, CMI
has released a series of 5000 breath testing devices.85  The courts con-
strued the statute to mean that testimony about any 5000 series device
was admissible “without expert testimony” establishing the reliability
of the device.86  As in Minnesota, any listed device is “presumed relia-
ble;”87 and a defendant has the burden of showing that “software
changes and upgrades” in later versions of the 5000 series device ren-
dered the modified version of the device “unreliable.”88
The Minnesota and New York cases made short shrift of defend-
ants’ attempts to raise doubts about the reliability of the testing de-
vices.  The Minnesota courts rejected the defendants’ attempts as
79. MINN. STAT. § 634.16.
80. In re Comm’r of Public Safety, 735 N.W.2d 706, 710 (Minn. 2007); State v. Underdahl, 749
N.W.2d 117, 120–21 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008), rev’d in part, aff’d in part, 767 N.W.2d 677 (Minn.
2009) (affirming one appellant’s order to produce source code, while reversing another appel-
lant’s order denying the production of source code).
81. Underdahl, 749 N.W.2d at 121.
82. Id. at 120; In re Comm’r of Public Safety, 735 N.W.2d. at 710.
83. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 59.4 (2010).
84. Cialino, 831 N.Y.S.2d at 681.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 682.
87. Id.
88. Id.  But see Commonwealth v. Camblin, 31 N.E.3d 1102 (Mass. 2015).  In Camblin, the
court refused to apply the Massachusetts statute analogous to the Minnesota and New York
statutes. Id. at 1112–13.  The court dealt with the Alcotest 7110 MK III-C, manufactured by
Draeger Safety Diagnostics, Inc. Id. at 1104.  The device was a “new generation,” dual sensoric
instrument employing a fuel cell test as well as an infrared test. Id. at 1108, 1110.  The court held
that since the instrument was the “first” device of its kind, the statute did not automatically
insulate it from a reliability challenge. Id. at 1112.
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“inadequate.”89  The New York cases are even more dismissive; they
characterized the defense arguments as mere “fishing expedition[s].”90
The decisions place the burden squarely on the shoulders of the de-
fense.91  Without expert testimony identifying faults in the source
code for the Intoxilyzer 5000’s software, defendants have been unable
to meet that burden.
2. The TrueAllele Technique
In the leading Intoxilyzer 5000 cases in Minnesota and New York,
the prosecution had the benefit of a state statute obviating the need
for foundational expert testimony so long as the prosecution witness
used a breath testing device on the state’s approved product list.  To
date, no jurisdiction has enacted a statute dispensing with the need for
foundational testimony when the prosecution proffers testimony
about a TrueAllele analysis of the genetic profiles of the contributors
to a mixed DNA sample.  Even without the benefit of such statutes,
prosecutors have generally succeeded in introducing testimony based
on the TrueAllele technique.  The testimony has been admitted over
defendants’ objections in at least seven states.92  Rather than invoking
a statute eliminating the need for expert testimony, prosecutors in the
TrueAllele cases have followed the conventional approach of laying a
foundation by presenting testimony about validation studies establish-
ing the reliability of the scientific technique.93  There have been sev-
89. State v. Underdahl, 749 N.W.2d 171 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008), rev’d in part, aff’d in part, 767
N.W.2d 677 (Minn. 2009).
90. People v. Robinson, 860 N.Y.S.2d 159, 166 (App. Div. 2008); Cialino, 831 N.Y.S.2d at 682.
91. Cialino, 831 N.Y.S.2d at 682.
92. Palazzolo, supra note 27; see DAVID KAYE ET AL., THE NEW WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON R
EVIDENCE: EXPERT EVIDENCE 263–77 (2016 Supp.); Moss, supra note 23, at 1061–70.  Moss R
discusses the following decisions:
• Queen v. Colin Duffy & Brian Shivers, [2011] NICC 37 (N. Ir. Crim.).  This case was a
prosecution in Northern Ireland.  The judge conceded that as of 2011, only a “very small
portion” of the world’s DNA laboratories used TrueAllele.  Moss, supra note 23, at 1065. R
The judge relied heavily on a recommendation by the New York Commission on Forensic
Science DNA Subcommittee that New York adopt the technique. Id. at 1065.
• Commonwealth v. Foley, 38 A.3d 882 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012).  The court ruled that the availa-
ble validation studies established the reliability of TrueAllele.  Moss, supra note 23, at 1067. R
• Ohio v. Shaw, CR-13-575691, at *21 (Cuyahoga Ct. C.P. Oct. 10, 2014).  The court noted
that other jurisdictions had admitted testimony based on TrueAllele and added that the
validation studies constituted sufficient testing of the technique.  Moss, supra note 23, at R
1070.
Id.
93. Moss, supra note 23, at 1061–70.  There have also been tests of STRmix, another probabil- R
istic genotyping program.  People v. Muhammad, No. 14-56263-FC, at *5 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Dec. 15,
2015), http://media.mlive.com/chronicle/news_impact/other/muhammad-opinion.pdf; Josh S.
Hausman, Michigan Judge’s Landmark DNA Ruling Could Revolutionize CSI Work, MLIVE
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eral published validation studies for TrueAllele.94  In a statement on
the Cybergenetics website, the developer of TrueAllele, Dr. Mark
Perlin, asserted that courts admitting TrueAllele testimony have
reached the right result because “[s]cientists test executable software
programs on real data [in validation studies]; they do not read source
code text.”95
B. The Discoverability of the Source Code for the Software
Automated Forensic Techniques
Courts have not only had to grapple with questions of the admissi-
bility of automated forensic techniques without foundational testi-
mony about the source code of the software controlling the
automation, but they have also been forced to address the pretrial dis-
coverability of the source code.  While the prosecution has almost uni-
formly prevailed in cases analyzing the admissibility of the trial
(Dec. 23, 2015, 12:03 PM), http://www.mlive.com/news/muskegon/index.ssf/2015/12/michigan_
judges_landmark_dna_r.html.
94. Paula Reed Ward, Judge to Allow DNA Evidence in Deaths of Wolfe Sisters, PITT. POST-
GAZETTE (Oct. 30, 2015, 12:00 AM), http://www.post-gazette.com/local/city/2015/10/30/allow-
DNA-evidence-in-deaths-of-East-Liberty-Wolfe-sisters/stories/201510300182; see Susan A.
Greenspoon et al., Establishing the Limits of TrueAllele Casework: A Validation Study, 60 J.
FORENSIC SCI. 1263 (2015); Mark W. Perlin et al., TrueAllele Casework on Virginia DNA Mix-
ture Evidence: Computer and Manual Interpretation in 72 Reported Criminal Cases, 9 PLOS ONE
(2014); Mark W. Perlin et al., New York State TrueAllele Casework Validation Study, 58 J. FO-
RENSIC SCI. 1458 (2013); Mark W. Perlin et al., TrueAllele Genotype Identification on DNA Mix-
tures Containing up to Five Unknown Contributors, 60 J. FORENSIC SCI. 857 (2015); Mark W.
Perlin et al., Validating TrueAllele DNA Mixture Interpretation, 56 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1430 (2011);
see also Case Study: TrueAllele Validation on 16 Case Mixture Items, THE DNA INVESTIGATOR,
Spring 2010, at 2; Steven Myers & Jeanette Wallin, STRmix V2.0.6 BFS Casework Internal Vali-
dation Summaries, EPIC (2016), https://epic.org/state-policy/foia/dna-software/EPIC-16-02-02-
CalDOJ-FOIA-20160219-STRmix-V2.0.6-Validation-Summaries.pdf (study evaluating the use of
TrueAllele by the California Department of Justice Laboratory in Richmond, California).  In a
presentation entitled Fighting for DNA Justice: Genotyping Software in the Hillary Acquittal, in
October 2016 in New York, Dr. Mark Perlin stated that there have been thirty-four validation
studies of TrueAllele, including seven published studies. See Mark W. Perlin, Fighting for DNA
Justice: Genotyping in the Hillary Acquittal, CYBERGENETICS (Oct. 2016), https://www.cybgen
.com/information/presentations/2016/Legal-Aid/Perlin-Fighting-for-DNA-justice-genotyping-
software-in-the-Hillary-acquittal/handout.pdf.  He added that on ten occasions, the technique
has survived admissibility challenges under Frye or Daubert. Id. at 4.  The slides for Dr. Perlin’s
presentation are available from Cybergenetics. Id. at 1.
95. Seth Augenstein, Access Denied: Source Code for DNA Software Remains Protected in Pa.
Murder Trial, FORENSIC MAG. (Feb. 5, 2016), http://www.forensicmag.com/article/2016/02/ac
cess-denied-source-code-dna-software-remains-protected-pa-murder-trial; see Commonwealth v.
Robinson, No. CC 201307777 (Pa. Ct. C.P. Allegeheny Cty. Feb. 4, 2016); see also Palazzolo,
supra note 27 (discussing a recent ruling by Pennsylvania Judge Jill Rangos in the prosecution of R
Michael Robinson for homicide); Silver, supra note 27.  In Commonwealth v. Foley, the court R
stated that “scientists can validate the reliability of a computerized process even if the source
code underlying that process is not available to the public.”  38 A.3d 882, 889 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2012).
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testimony, the results on the pretrial discoverability issue have been
more mixed.  Once again the cases have come in two waves.
1. Infrared Breath Testing Techniques
Courts are divided over whether the defendants have a pretrial dis-
covery right to access to the source code for breath testing devices.  In
three jurisdictions—Connecticut,96 Florida,97 and New York98—the
court rebuffed the defendants’ efforts to gain access to the source
code for an evaluation by defense experts.  The courts reasoned that
under its contracts with the manufacturer, the government had neither
ownership nor actual or constructive possession of the code.99  In ad-
dition, the courts concluded that the manufacturer could not be forced
to divulge the code because the source code constitutes a protected
trade secret.100  Every American jurisdiction recognizes an evidentiary
privilege protecting trade secrets.101
In contrast, Minnesota courts have permitted discovery after care-
fully reviewing the language of the contract between the government
and CMI.  Initially, an intermediate Minnesota appellate court read
the contract and found that the source code was “not proprietary” and
that the source code for the model sold to Minnesota was “created
specifically for the Minnesota model of the Intoxilyzer.”102  Later, the
Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that under the terms of the state’s
original request for proposal, the code was the state’s property.103
The trial court had ordered disclosure of the code and ruled that un-
96. See State v. Burnell, No. MV06479034S, 2007 WL 241230 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 18, 2007);
State v. Walters, No. DBDMV050340997S, 2006 WL 785393 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 15, 2006).
97. See Moe v. State, 944 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
98. See People v. Robinson, 860 N.Y.S.2d 159, 168 (App. Div. 2008); Cialino, 831 N.Y.S.2d at
681.
99. See, e.g., People v. Cialino, 831 N.Y.S.2d 680, 681 (Crim. Ct. 2007).
100. Burnell, 2007 WL 241230, at *2 (“CMI, Inc., manufacturer of the Intoxilyzer 5000,
through its counsel, has declined to produce the items, claiming they constitute trade secrets.”);
Moe, 944 So. 2d at 1097 (“It is . . . without dispute that the code is a trade secret of CMI, Inc. and
that CMI, Inc. has invoked its statutory and common law privileges protecting the code from
disclosure. Therefore, the State cannot obtain possession of the code.”); Robinson, 860 N.Y.S.2d
at 167 (“The Intoxilyzer source code was not the property of the State, since it was owned and
copyrighted by its manufacturer, CMI, Inc., a Kentucky corporation, and is a trade secret of
CMI, Inc.”); Cialino, 831 N.Y.S.2d at 681 (holding that the source code was “the property of a
corporation that invoked statutory and common law privileges protecting the code from disclo-
sure, thereby making it unobtainable”).
101. 2 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: EVIDEN-
TIARY PRIVILEGES § 9.2.1 (2d ed. 2010).
102. In re Comm’r of Public Safety, 735 N.W.2d 706, 709–10 (Minn. 2007).
103. State v. Underdahl, 767 N.W.2d 677, 686 (Minn. 2009).  The court noted that “[o]ne pro-
vision of the RFP, titled ‘ownership of copyright,’ states that any copyrightable material would
‘be the property of the State and are by this Contract assigned to the State.’” Id. at 686 n.6.
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less the state complied with the order, testimony about the Intoxilyzer
test result would be excluded and the charge dismissed.104  The Min-
nesota Supreme Court affirmed the order for the production of the
complete computer source code.105
2. The TrueAllele Technique
As we have seen, courts in the first wave of cases were divided over
the discoverability of the source code for infrared breath testing de-
vices.  However, even then the prevailing view was that defendants
were not entitled to discovery.  In the second wave of cases, in which
the focus shifted to probabilistic genotyping programs, notably
TrueAllele, there has been a greater consensus among the courts.  To
date, although the issue has been litigated in at least seven states, no
state court has ordered discovery of the TrueAllele source code.106
Rather, harking back to precedent from Connecticut, Florida, and
New York, the courts have uniformly denied discovery because the
source code constitutes a trade secret and Cybergenetics has properly
asserted the evidentiary privilege protecting trade secrets.107
IV. A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE CURRENT
STATE OF THE LAW
This Part addresses whether prosecution should be permitted to in-
troduce expert testimony based on computerized techniques without
presenting foundational testimony about the validity of the source
code.  This Part concludes that prosecution may do so; however, there
are circumstances in which defendants should have access to the
source code in order to challenge the weight of the testimony about
the technique.
104. Id. at 680.
105. Id. at 687; see also State v. Chun, 943 A.2d 114, 174 (N.J. 2008) (requiring a breathalyzer
manufacturer to disclose any future changes to software code).  In an earlier decision, 923 A.2d
226, 226–27 (N.J. 2007), the court granted the defense discovery motion but stated only that
“good cause appear[ed]” for disclosure.
106. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Robinson, No. CC 201307777 (Pa. Ct. C.P. Feb. 4, 2016); see
also Palazzo, supra note 27; Silver, supra note 27.  In one case, a California court ordered discov- R
ery, but the intermediate appellate court reversed the order, and the California Supreme Court
declined to review the reversal.  People v. Superior Court (Chubbs), No. B258569, 2015 WL
139069 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2015).  In United States v. Kevin Johnson, a federal District Court
ordered discovery of the source code for the Forensic Statistical Tool used by the New York City
Office of the Chief Medical Examiner.  No. 15-CR-565 (VEC) (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2016).  In her
order, Judge Valerie Caproni stated that she was “prepared to enter a protective order if OCME
wishes . . . .” Id. at 1.
107. Robinson, 860 N.Y.S.2d at 167 (holding that the software source could would be not be
admitted because its release would cause irreparable harm to the manufacturer); Palazzo, supra
note 27. R
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A. The Admissibility of Prosecution Testimony Based on
Automated Forensic Techniques
The threshold question is whether the prosecution may introduce
evidence based on an automated forensic technique, without present-
ing testimony validating source code of the software controlling the
automation.  To answer that question, we must distinguish two types
of jurisdictions.
1. Jurisdictions That Do Not Require a Showing of the Scientific
Validation of a Forensic Technique as Part of the
Foundation for Admissibility
To begin, suppose the legislature has enacted a statute that, if fairly
interpreted, manifests a legislative intent to permit the introduction of
evidence, based on a forensic technique, without the need for founda-
tional testimony about the scientific validation of the technique.  In
most jurisdictions the state legislature has the power to prescribe evi-
dentiary rules for the courts.108  Some state legislatures have exercised
power to provide statutorily for the admission of testimony based on
forensic techniques such as breath testing devices109 and DNA typ-
ing.110  Unless the court invalidates the statute on some constitutional
ground, the statute eliminates the need for the prosecution to present
any foundational testimony about the empirical validity of the tech-
nique.  In these jurisdictions, there is no need for the prosecution to
show the validity of the source code in the software for the automated
technique.
In addition, although the majority of states111 have now adopted
some variation of the empirical validation standard that the U.S. Su-
108. Giannelli, The Proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence, supra note 77, at 20 (discussing the R
factors the Ohio General Assembly uses when promulgating the Ohio Rules of Evidence). But
see Brim v. State, 624 N.E.2d 27, 33 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (striking down an evidentiary rule
because the statute “conflict[ed] with the rule adopted in” an Indiana Supreme Court decision).
109. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 634.16 (2015); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. § 1194(b) (McKinney 2010)
(stating that a breath test may be administered by a police officer).
110. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 35-37-4-13(b) (“In a criminal trial or hearing, the results of forensic
DNA analysis are admissible in evidence without antecedent expert testimony that forensic
DNA analysis provides a trustworthy and reliable method of identifying characteristics in an
individual’s genetic material.”); Elizabeth Marie Bezak, Note, DNA Profiling Evidence: The
Need for a Uniform and Workable Evidentiary Standard of Admissibility, 26 VA. U.L. REV. 595,
620 nn.175–79 (1992) (listing state statutes); Jayne L. Jakubaitis, Note, ‘Genetically’ Altered Ad-
missibility: Legislative Notice of DNA Typing, 39 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 415, 426 (1991); Note, A
Defense Counsel’s Guide to the Use of DNA Evidence in Virginia, 2 REGENT U.L. REV. 113, 114
n.6 (1992) (listing state statutes).
111. 1 GIANNELLI ET AL., supra note 19, §§ 1.14–1.15 (noting a total of thirty states have R
moved to Daubert analysis of evidence).
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preme Court announced in its 1993 decision, Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,112 a minority of states still adhere to the tradi-
tional Frye113 “general acceptance” test.  Under the Frye test, the pro-
ponent of scientific testimony need not show the empirical validation
of a scientific technique or theory.114  Rather, the proponent must
demonstrate that the technique or theory has gained a certain degree
of popularity—“general acceptance”—within the relevant scientific
fields.115  Courts favoring the general acceptance standard have
doubts about the competence of lay jurors and trial judges to critically
evaluate scientific testimony.116  Given those doubts, courts have em-
braced general acceptance as a proxy117 for the scientific validity of
the theory or technique.  In effect, these courts delegate the admissi-
bility decision to the scientific community.  Unlike the states with stat-
utes authorizing the admission of particular types of scientific
evidence without expert foundational testimony, these jurisdictions
require such testimony.  This required testimony must speak to the
extent of the consensus supporting the technique rather than the un-
derlying empirical validation.
2. Jurisdictions That Require a Showing of the Scientific Validation
as Part of the Foundation for Admissibility
Until the early 1970s, federal courts and the overwhelming majority
of states used Frye’s general acceptance standard as the litmus test for
determining the admissibility of scientific testimony.118  At one point,
Frye was the law in federal court and also in forty five states;119 how-
ever, in 1975, the Federal Rules of Evidence took effect.120  Article
VII of the new rules dealt with expert opinion testimony.121  Article
VII did not contain any language that could reasonably be interpreted
as codifying the traditional general acceptance test.  Moreover, Fed-
112. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
113. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923), superseded by rule as recognized
in Daubert, 509 U.S 579.
114. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.
115. 1 GIANNELLI ET AL., supra note 19, § 1.06[c]. R
116. Id. § 1.06[a].
117. Bert Black et al., Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert: A New Search for Scien-
tific Knowledge, 72 TEX. L. REV. 715, 718–19 (1994); see Edward J. Imwinkelried, The End of the
Era of Proxies 8 (UC Davis Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 250, 2011),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1777551.
118. 1 GIANNELLI, ET AL., supra note 19, § 1.06. R
119. Betty R. Steingass, Changing the Standard for the Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evi-
dence: State v. Williams, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 757, 769 n.83 (1979).
120. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072, 2075
(2012)).
121. Id. art. VII, 88 Stat. 1937.
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eral Rule 402 manifested a legislative intent to abolish uncodified re-
strictions on the admission of logically relevant evidence that satisfied
the exclusionary rules set out in the rules.122  It was against this back-
drop that the Supreme Court handed down its Daubert decision in
1993.123
In Daubert, the Court initially ruled that the general acceptance test
was no longer good law in federal practice.124  Writing for the Court,
Justice Blackmun relied on Rule 402125 and stated that he could not
find any language in the statutory text that could reasonably bear the
interpretation that it incorporated the Frye test.126  He wrote that the
general acceptance standard was an “austere”127 test at odds with the
“liberal,”128 “permissive”129 thrust of the Federal Rules.
Justice Blackmun quickly added that the abolition of the general
acceptance test did not mean expert testimony was freely admissible
in federal court.130  At this juncture in the opinion, Justice turned to
the text of Rule 702 governing the admissibility of “scientific, techni-
cal, or other specialized knowledge.”131  The Justice focused on the
interpretation of the expression, “scientific . . . knowledge.”132  In his
mind, Congress’ choice of the noun “knowledge” meant that an expert
opinion must rest on more than an expert’s subjective belief or unsub-
stantiated speculation.133  The crucial question then became the mean-
ing of the adjective “scientific.”  Drawing on a number of amicus
briefs filed by scientists and scientific organizations,134 Justice Black-
mun defined the adjective in methodological terms.135  He referred to
122. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Federal Rule of Evidence 402: The Second Revolution, 6 REV.
LITIG. 129, 139 (1987).  At the time of its enactment, Rule 402 stated that all logically relevant
evidence is admissible unless the judge can justify excluding the evidence under the Constitution,
another provision of the Federal Rules, or other rules adopted by the Supreme Court pursuant
to statutory authority (i.e. the Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure). Id. at 130. Frye
was a creature of case law.  Construed in light of Rule 1001(b)(5), restyled Rule 402 is to the
same effect.
123. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993).
124. Id. at 597–98.
125. Id. at 588.
126. Id. at 589.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 588; see Almonte v. Averna Vision & Robotics, Inc., 128 F. Supp. 3d 729, 738
(W.D.N.Y. 2015).
129. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
130. Id.
131. FED. R. EVID. 702.
132. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 581.
135. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Daubert Decision: Frye Is Dead, Long Live the Federal
Rules of Evidence, TRIAL, Sept. 1993, at 60, 62–63.
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the classic Newtonian methodology of formulating a hypothesis, sub-
jecting the hypothesis to empirical testing to falsify or validate the hy-
pothesis, and lastly evaluating the results of the testing.136  Again
relying on the amicus briefs, he acknowledged the modern under-
standing that even when a scientist properly uses this methodology, he
or she cannot achieve absolute certainty.137  The Justice explained that
to qualify as sufficiently reliable and admissible “scientific . . . knowl-
edge,” a technique or theory must rest on adequate validation.138  The
Court declared that trial judges have a “gatekeeping”139 responsibility
to ensure that proffered scientific testimony passes muster.  To help
trial judges discharge that responsibility, Justice Blackmun listed sev-
eral factors that trial judges could consider, including whether the hy-
pothesis is empirically testable, whether it has been subjected to
testing, whether the error rate was ascertained from the testing, and
whether there are recognized procedures for conducting the testing.140
Daubert was the first in a trilogy of high-profile Supreme Court de-
cisions on the admissibility of the expert testimony.  After rendering
Daubert in 1993, the Court handed down General Electric Co. v.
Joiner141 in 1997 and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael142 in 1999.  Col-
lectively, the Court’s teaching is that the proponent of expert must
make a foundational showing that by using the particular technique or
theory143 the expert employed, the expert can accurately draw the
136. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.
137. Id. (“[A]rguably, there are no certainties in science.”); see Edward Imwinkelried, The
Importance of Forensic Metrology in Preventing Miscarriages of Justice: Intellectual Honesty
About the Uncertainty of Measurement in Scientific Analysis, 7 J. MARSHALL. L.J. 333, 346–47
(2014).
If the outcomes of numerous empirical tests of the hypothesis all confirm the hypothe-
sis, we can have increasing confidence in the validity of the hypothesis.  However, we
cannot regard the hypothesis as “definitively confirmed because it is always possible
that an empirical test will someday demonstrate the theory to be incorrect.”  Another
empirical test is always conceivable; and so long as that is true, a theoretical possibility
of falsification or disproof remains . . . .  When an expert relies on inductive reasoning
to investigate the truth of a hypothesis, at most, the hypothesis can be accepted contin-
gently or provisionally.
Id.; see Edward J. Imwinkelried, Evidence Law Visits Jurassic Park: The Far-Reaching Implica-
tions of the Daubert Court’s Recognition of the Scientific Enterprise, 81 IOWA L. REV. 55, 58
(1995).
138. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589–90 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702).
139. Id. at 597.
140. Id. at 593–94.
141. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
142. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
143. D. Michael Risinger, Defining the “Task at Hand”: Non-Science Forensic Science After
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767, 773 (2000) (noting that the Su-
preme Court’s trilogy of decisions, Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho makes it clear that the question
is not the “global validity” of the discipline or field); see Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Meaning
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specific type of inference144 that he or she contemplates testifying to.
The Court’s reliability test has gradually garnered support among the
states, and it is now the dominant test used by a majority of states.145
We must ask: In a Daubert jurisdiction, must the proponent of evi-
dence based on a computerized forensic technique present expert tes-
timony about the computer’s source code as part of the foundation for
the evidence?  Even in a Daubert jurisdiction requiring proof of vali-
dation as an essential part of the foundation, the answer is “no.”  The
proponent can meet that burden without proffering testimony about
the validity of the source code.  Instead, as prosecutors have success-
fully argued in the TrueAllele cases,146 the government can meet that
burden by presenting testimony about validation studies investigating
the accuracy of the software.
There is often more than one way that the proponent of expert tes-
timony can lay an adequate foundation validating the underlying the-
ory or technique.  For instance, suppose that the hypothesis relates to
a proposition in the field of toxicology, such as the theory that expo-
sure to a particular pesticide can cause a certain type of cancer.  The
proponent of that theory can rely on formal epidemiological studies to
validate that hypothesis.147  Absent epidemiological data, some juris-
dictions accept a combination of animal studies and chemical structure
analyses as an alternative method of validation.148  On the other hand,
suppose that the proponent attempts to introduce testimony based on
a new DNA testing kit.  The court may dispense with the need for
proof of new validation studies for the novel kit if the proponent can
show that with minor changes, the new kit represents a modest modi-
fication of a previously validated DNA typing methodology.149
The very purpose of a validation study is to investigate whether the
theory or technique does what its proponent claims.150  Suppose that
the issue is whether TrueAllele enables an expert to accurately deter-
of “Appropriate Validation” in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Interpreted in
Light of the Broader Rationalist Tradition, Not the Narrow Scientific Tradition, 30 FLA. ST. U.L.
REV. 735, 740–42 (2003) (reviewing the language in the three cases that indicates that the ana-
lytic focus has narrowed to the specific technique or theory that the expert contemplates using).
144. See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 144 (discussing the admissibility of “these experts’ opinions”).
145. See 1 GIANNELLI ET AL., supra note 19 §§ 1.14–1.15. R
146. Palazzolo, supra note 27. R
147. 1 GIANNELLI ET AL., supra note 19, § 15.05[d] (discussing epidemiological studies as a R
method of proving causation).
148. Id.
149. See People v. Cordova, 358 P.3d 518, 538 (Cal. 2015).
150. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Coming to Grips with Scientific Research in Daubert’s
“Brave New World”: The Courts’ Need to Appreciate the Evidentiary Differences Between Valid-
ity and Proficiency Studies, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1247, 1256–60 (1995).
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mine the genetic profiles of multiple contributors to a mixed DNA
sample, and that in well-designed validation studies the use of TrueAl-
lele enables researchers to do precisely that.  Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 901(b)(9) captures the essence of the “authentication” or
validation of a scientific technique.151  In the words of 901(b)(9), the
essential foundation is a “showing that [the process or system] pro-
duces an accurate result.”152  Validation studies summarizing the re-
sults of tests of the technique and showing that the technique yields
accurate results satisfy that standard.  As a matter of logic, the court
should treat the studies as adequate validation under Daubert. The
proponent can shoulder the burden under Daubert without making a
further, separate showing about the source code of the software con-
trolling TrueAllele.  The lack of testimony about the source code
might increase the degree of uncertainty in the expert’s final opinion,
but post-Daubert, the expert need not vouch for his or her opinion as
a certainty.153  In short, many courts have reached the correct result
that prosecution evidence based on TrueAllele can be admitted, even
without testimony about the source code.154
B. The Discoverability of the Source Code of the Software for the
Automated Forensic Technique
Assume arguendo that a court rules the proponent has laid an ade-
quate foundation for the admissibility of evidence, which is based on
an automated forensic technique, without any showing of the accuracy
of the software’s source code.  Does the opponent have a pretrial dis-
covery right to access the source code?  Again, to date in the TrueAl-
lele cases, all the state courts that have reached this question have
denied defendants’ discovery requests.155  Have the courts reached the
correct result here, as they have on the admissibility question dis-
cussed in Subpart A?  To resolve that question, we must assess both
151. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(9).
152. Id.
153. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993); see Imwinkelried, The
Importance of Forensic Metrology, supra note 137, at 345–53 (discussing how given Daubert, the R
courts should neither require nor even permit experts to vouch for their opinions as absolute
certainties).
154. See SHIRA A. SCHEINDLIN, ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY AND DIGITAL EVIDENCE IN A NUT-
SHELL 413–14 (2d ed. 2016) (discussing United States v. Chiaradio, 684 F.3d 265, 278 (1st Cir.
2012) (sustaining the admission of testimony based on the government enhanced peer-to-peer
file-sharing program in a child pornography case even though the program’s source code had not
been peer reviewed)).
155. Palazzolo, supra note 27; see Commonwealth v. Robinson, No. CC 201307777 (Pa. Ct. R
C.P. Allegeheny Cty. Feb. 4, 2016); see also Silver, supra note 27. R
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the defendants’ alleged need for access and the countervailing
considerations.
1. The Defense’s Alleged Need for Access to TrueAllele’s Source
Code
In the TrueAllele cases, defendants have urged that it is unfair to
deny them access and treat the program’s source code as a mysterious
“black box.”156  Some may argue that it is a waste of time to grant the
defense access to the source code if, ex hypothesi, testimony based on
the automated forensic technique will prove nonetheless admissible in
a jurisdiction following Daubert.  This counterargument misses the
mark.  Even when the proponent’s item of evidence is admissible, the
opponent has the right to attack the weight or believability of the evi-
dence.157  Just as the jury need not believe all evidence, the opponent
has a right to attack the weight of the proponent’s admissible evi-
dence.  The U.S. Supreme Court has held that in criminal cases, the
defendant’s right to attack the weight of the prosecution’s evidence is
of constitutional dimension under the Sixth Amendment Confronta-
tion Clause.158
For that matter, it should come as no surprise that even if the judge
rules an item of prosecution evidence admissible, there can be signifi-
cant remaining questions about the weight and believability of the evi-
dence.  In Daubert, the Supreme Court announced that under Federal
Rule of Evidence 702 the trial judge has an important “gatekeeping”
responsibility to police the reliability of proffered expert testimony.159
However, the Court made that announcement in an opinion in which
it characterized the general spirit of the Federal Rules as “liberal”160
and “permissive.”161  Furthermore, Justice Blackmun emphasized that
156. Jessica Leber, The Problem with Using Secret Computer Code to Put People in Jail,
CO.EXIST (Nov. 2, 2015, 8:01 AM), http://www.fastcoexist.com/3052420/the-problem-with-using-
secret-computer-code-to-put-people-in-jail.
157. See infra notes 158–162 and accompanying text; see also Comment, Pomona v. SQM R
North America Corp.: Trial Courts as “Gatekeeper” Under Daubert and its Progeny, 39 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 377, 387 (2015).
158. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 686–87 (1986); see United States v. Bess, 75 M.J. 70,
75–76 (C.A.A.F. Jan. 6, 2016) (ruling that certain muster reports are admissible at a hearing
outside the jury’s presence; the judge submitted the reports to the court-martial members with-
out allowing the defendant to attack the weight of the reports in front of the members; the judge
“does not limit the right of a party to introduce before the trier of fact evidence relevant to
weight or credibility”).
159. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).
160. Id. at 588; see Seamon v. Remington Arms Co., 813 F.3d 983, 988 (11th Cir. 2016); United
States v. Rodriguez, 125 F. Supp. 3d 1216, 1231–32 (D.N.M. 2015); Veleron Holding, B.V. v.
Stanley, 117 F. Supp. 3d 404, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
161. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
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the focus of the judge’s analysis must be an evaluation of the sound-
ness of the expert’s methodology in reaching his or her conclusion, not
the conclusion itself.162  The Court’s message has not been lost on ei-
ther the Advisory Committee or the lower courts.  In 2000, the Advi-
sory Committee amended Federal Rule of Evidence 702, and in a note
to the Amendment, the Committee approvingly quoted the Third Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals: Proponents are not required to “demonstrate
to the judge by a preponderance of the evidence that the assessments
of their experts are correct, they only have to demonstrate by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that their opinions are reliable . . . .  The
evidentiary requirement of reliability is lower than the merits stan-
dards of correctness.”163  The lower courts have frequently stated that
when evaluating the admissibility of the proffered expert testimony,
their inquiry is “limited”164 as well as “preliminary.”165  Indeed, the
lower courts sometimes add that “[i]n general, Rule 702 has been in-
terpreted to favor admissibility.”166  Construed together, these
passages in Daubert, the lower court opinions, and the Advisory Com-
mittee Notes demonstrate the correctness of Justice Blackmun’s ob-
servation in Daubert that evidence admissible under Rule 702 could
still be “shaky.”167
How shaky could the weight of admissible testimony about an auto-
mated forensic technique be?  A study of the source code for New
Jersey’s breath testing devices “uncovered a variety of defects that
could impact the test results.”168  Yet, in the initial wave of source
code decision involving breath testing devices, courts repeatedly as-
serted that there is little need for discovery of the source code because
the defense had “other avenues of challenge” to the weight of the
162. Id.
163. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment (quoting In re Paoli
R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 744 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied sub nom. General Electric v.
Ingram, 513 U.S. 1190 (1995)).
164. DL v. Dist. of Columbia, 109 F. Supp. 3d 12, 28 (D.D.C. 2015).
165. In re NJOY, Inc. Consumer Class Action Litig., 120 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1068–69 (C.D. Cal.
2015) (the Supreme Court itself used that adjective); see Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592.
166. DL, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 27–28 (quoting Khairkhwa v. Obama, 793 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10
(D.D.C. 2011)).  The court also quotes the Advisory Committee’s observation that “[a] review of
the caselaw after Daubert shows that the rejection of expert testimony is the exception rather
than the rule.” FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note to the 2000 amendments.
167. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596; see Rodman v. Safeway Inc., 125 F. Supp. 3d 922, 937 (N.D. Cal.
2015); Speaks v. Mazda Motor Corp., 118 F. Supp. 3d 1212, 1218 (D. Mont. 2015); see also Com-
ment, Pomona v. SQM North America Corp.: Trial Courts as “Gatekeeper” Under Daubert and
Its Progeny, 39 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 377, 387 (2015) (noting that even if scientific testimony is
admissible under Daubert, it can be “precarious”).
168. State v. Underdahl, 767 N.W.2d 677, 685 (Minn. 2009) (describing a report submitted in
State v. Chun, 943 A.2d 114, 132–33 (N.J. 2008)).
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prosecution evidence.169  At the same time that these courts denied
the defendants access to the source code, they pointed out that the
defendants had access to documentation, including the device’s main-
tenance records and the checklist the analyst used in conducting the
test.170  Those records do not contain the same information that an
examination of the software’s source code would yield.  The analyst’s
checklist might minimize the risk of human error in conducting a test
at a specific time and place, but the checklist provides no insight into
any inherent defects in the program logic.  Likewise, maintenance
records could prove that for a certain period after a maintenance the
device was operating as intended; but again, even if the device was
operating as intended, there might be a defect buried in the source
code.  In sum, the discoverability of those documents does not under-
cut the case for discovery of the source code.
The real issue is the soundness of Cybergenetics’ contention that
the availability of validation studies for TrueAllele eliminates any le-
gitimate need to study the source code.171  In civil cases involving
source code discovery, litigants have occasionally opposed discovery
by arguing that the available validation studies enable the opponent to
study “the correlation between input data and output data,” so as to
determine whether the program operates accurately.172  In the same
vein, in a Minnesota case denying discovery of the source code for the
Intoxilyzer 5000EN, the court concluded that a review of available
validation studies allows an opponent to determine whether a com-
puter program contains deficiencies “without access to the source
code.”173
Is that conclusion correct?  On close scrutiny, the answer is that the
conclusion is correct—sometimes.  The answer does not turn on the
mere existence of validation studies or even their availability to the
defense.  Rather, the answer depends on the number of studies, their
quality, the findings in the studies, and a comparison between the test
conditions and the conditions in the instant case.
By way of example, assume that the trial judge construed Rule 702
so liberally that the judge allowed the prosecution to introduce testi-
169. People v. Robinson, 860 N.Y.S.2d 159, 165 (App. Div. 2008) (quoting People v. Alvarez,
515 N.E.2d 898, 900 (N.Y. 1987)).
170. Robinson, 860 N.Y.S.2d at 166 (discussing “calibration records,” records which are
“showing “that the machine was . . . properly maintained or that the test was . . . properly
administered”).
171. Palazzolo, supra note 27. R
172. Mislow, supra note 12, at 46. R
173. State v. Underdahl, 749 N.W.2d 117, 121–22, aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 767 N.W.2d 677
(Minn. 2009).
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mony about the results of the use of a new automated forensic tech-
nique based on meager validation data—perhaps even a single
validation study.  This state of the record presents an appealing case
for defense discovery.  If the basis for admitting the testimony is so
thin that it barely passes Daubert muster, the testimony would  argua-
bly remain “shaky;”174 and defendants would have a powerful argu-
ment that the unresolved questions about the reliability of the
technique cut in favor of pretrial discovery.
However, in the case of TrueAllele, there have a been number of
published validation studies of the accuracy of the software.175  Here
the question becomes the extent or reach of the validation of the
software.  In Joiner,176 the plaintiff relied on four studies, particularly
studies that made use of animal research, to validate the hypothesis
that exposure to a particular chemical was capable of causing the kind
of cancer the plaintiff developed.177  The plaintiff’s studies were unde-
niably suggestive of causation, but, in the Court’s mind, the question
was the justifiability of extrapolating from those studies to the specific
inference that the plaintiff’s expert proposed drawing.178  The rub was
that there were numerous differences between the published studies
and the facts in Joiner.179
174. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S 579, 596 (1993).  Especially if you posit
the position of the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, it would be
dubious to admit the testimony based on a single validation study.  In its recent report, PRES.
COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT–FORENSIC SCIENCE IN
CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF FEATURE–COMPARISON METHODS
(2016), the Council discusses the concept of foundational validity.  The Council takes the posi-
tion that to be foundationally valid, a technique or theory must be supported by empirical re-
search demonstrating that its results are both repeatable and reproducible.  Id. at 47.
“Repeatable” denotes “that, with known probability, an examiner obtains the same result, when
analyzing samples from the same sources.”  Id. at 79.  In contrast, “reproducible” means “that,
with known probability, different examiners obtain the same result, when analyzing the sam-
ples.”  Id.  It will often be difficult to treat a single study as an adequate demonstration of
reproducibility.
175. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. R
176. General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S.136, 146–47 (1997).
177. Id. at 144.
178. Id. at 146.
179. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 143–45 (discussing the differences between animal studies and the
facts of the case).  Although the plaintiff’s experts proposed opining about causation in human
beings, the studies involved mice. Id.  The Court did not say categorically that a proponent may
never rely on animal studies, but the Court indicated that the judge should carefully scrutinize
the parameters of an animal study before allowing an expert to treat the study as an adequate
basis for an opinion about similar phenomena in human beings. Id.  Precisely for that reason,
the Court delved into other aspects of the animal studies.  The animal studies involved infant
mice while the plaintiff was an adult human being. Id.  The chemicals were injected into the
mice while the plaintiff had only dermal exposure.  Given their respective sizes, the mice re-
ceived “massive” doses compared to the limited exposure of the plaintiff.  Some of the mice
suffered from different illness than the cancer the plaintiff developed. Id.
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The Joiner Court ultimately concluded that the trial judge had not
abused her discretion in refusing to allow the plaintiff’s experts to rest
their opinions on the cited animal studies.180  For that matter, in the
seminal Daubert decision,181 the Court remarked that the expert evi-
dence must “fit” the facts of the instant case—raising the question of
the external validity of any study the expert relies on.182
An analogy to metrology, the science of measurement, may be help-
ful.183  The fundamental tenet of metrology is that to a degree, every
measurement is uncertain.184  It is impossible to know whether a mea-
surement has accurately captured the true value of the measurand, the
quantity or object being measured.185  Metrology attempts to identify
the sources of uncertainty in measurement and provide some sense of
the extent of the uncertainty.186  Metrologists have developed the no-
tion of a “range of calibration.”187  According to the National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST),
It is a generally accepted principle of reliable analysis that chemical
analyzers should be calibrated over the full range of measurement
and that measurement data be restricted to the range calibrated.  It
is not good measurement practice to report extrapolated data, i.e.,
outside of the range calibrated.  The range of reliable calibration
can be considered the range of reliable measurement and
conversely.188
NIST adds the caution that “[s]tandards should never be used in an
extrapolative mode.  They should always bracket the measurement
range.  No measurement should be reported at a value lower or higher
than the lowest or highest standard used to calibrate the measurement
process.”189  One Pennsylvania court endorsed this concept and held
that readings outside the range of calibration (of the state’s breath test
machines) were unacceptable and inadmissible.190
180. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 144.
181. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 597, 589–91 (1993).
182. DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., SCIENCE IN THE LAW: STANDARDS, STATISTICS, AND RE-
SEARCH ISSUES § 8 (2002).
183. TED VOSK & ASHLEY R. EMERY, FORENSIC METROLOGY: SCIENTIFIC MEASUREMENT
AND INFERENCE FOR LAWYERS, JUDGES, AND CRIMINALISTS § 1.4 (2015).
184. Id. § 6.2.
185. Id. § 1.4, Ch. 2.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 106.
188. Id. (quoting John K. Taylor, STANDARD REFERENCE MATERIALS:  HANDBOOK FOR SRM
USERS 7, U.S. DEPT. OF COMM. (1993)).
189. Taylor, supra note 188. R
190. Id.; see Commonwealth v. Schildt, No. 2191 CR 2010, Opinion (Pa. Ct. C.P. Dauphin Cty.
Dec. 31, 2012), https://www.thenewspaper.com/rlc/docs/2013/pa-intoxilyzer.pdf.  For a discussion
of Commonwealth v. Schildt, see Vosk & Emery, supra note 183, § 8. R
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In the context of this discovery issue, the courts should analogize to
the notion of range of calibration and recognize a parallel notion of a
range of validation.  When scientists conduct a validation study, they
control for certain variables and test the validity of the hypothesis
under those conditions.191  A successful test or, better still, a series of
successful tests supplies an objective basis for concluding that the hy-
pothesis (the accuracy of a certain technique or theory) is valid under
those conditions.192  However, test outcomes do not universally vali-
date the use of the hypothesis under all conditions.  Rather, the infer-
ence of the reliability of the technique or theory is fully warranted
only when the controlled variables are the same.193
During an admissibility analysis, most courts have not embraced
such a rigid notion of range-of-validation to prohibit all extrapolation.
It would be difficult to uphold such a prohibition given the Supreme
Court’s treatment of extrapolation in Joiner.  The Court did not forbid
extrapolation from empirical data by experts; instead, the Court cau-
tioned that the trial judge must carefully compare the conditions in
the studies with the conditions in the pending case to decide whether
an extrapolation is defensible.194  The Joiner Court’s position is sensi-
ble.  If in his or her work a scientist wants to know whether the same
experimental result will obtain under different conditions, the scientist
has the time and luxury of conducting another validation study under
the changed conditions.  However, by the time of trial, when an oppo-
nent points to a differing condition in the pending case, the failsafe
point may have been passed, and it may be too late to conduct a fur-
ther study before deciding whether to admit the proponent’s
testimony.
When the opponent can point to a difference in conditions that
could plausibly lead to a different outcome, the proponent is either at
the margins of the range of validation or has exceeded that range.
Here, the opponent should presumptively be entitled to discovery to
explore the significance of the suspected difference to determine how
“shaky”195 the difference renders the extrapolation.  Pretrial discovery
centered on such a difference would be far more than a speculative
191. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Debate in the DNA Cases Over the Foundation for the Ad-
mission of Scientific Evidence: The Importance of Human Error as a Cause of Forensic Misanal-
ysis, 69 WASH. U.L. Q. 19, 29 (1991).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. General Electric, Inc. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) (describing conclusions extrapo-
lated from data).
195. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993).
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fishing expedition.196  If a validation study for a program such as
TrueAllele involved only three contributors, but the pending prosecu-
tion is a gang rape prosecution alleging penetration by five contribu-
tors, there is a common sense question about the propriety of the
extrapolation.197  Likewise, if the validation study involved quantita-
tively equal fluid contributions but the analysis in the pending case
found a great disparity among the volumes of the contributions by the
various supposed rapists, questions would naturally arise from the dif-
ference in mixture proportions.198  Similarly, marked differences in
template quantity (the overall size of the sample) or the level of deg-
radation199 of the sample could generate doubts about the validity of
the extrapolation.  Allowing the opponent access to an automated fo-
rensic technique’s source code would be one of the most effective
ways to enable the opponent to conduct an exploration of such
questions.
2. Countervailing Considerations Against Granting the Defense
Access
Although the defense may have a significant interest in examining
the source code of the forensic technique’s computer software, the
software’s developer is likely to counter that it has an equally legiti-
mate, countervailing interest in protecting the source code as a trade
secret.  Courts in the first wave of source code cases involving breath
196. See People v. Robinson, 860 N.Y.S.2d 159, 166 (App. Div. 2008).
197. One validation study for another probabilistic genotyping software program, STRmix,
notes that a protocol had been validated only for one to three contributors. See STRmix V2.0.6
BFS CASEWORK INTERNAL VALIDATION SUMMARIES 2 (2016), https://epic.org/state-policy/foia/
dna-software/EPIC-16-02-02-CalDOJ-FOIA-20160219-STRmix-V2.0.6-Validation-Summaries
.pdf.
198. 2 GIANNELLI ET AL., supra note 5, § 18.04[b][2]. R
199. For that matter, various parts of a mixture may be degraded to a different degree.  The
various parts might involve different tissue types, or they have been deposited at different times.
NICHE VISION SOLE SOURCE JUSTIFICATION: STRMIX MIXTURE INTERPRETATION SOFTWARE—
JUSTIFICATION FOR NON-COMPETITIVE PROCUREMENT 2–3 (2014), https://epic.org/state-policy/
foia/dna-software/.  In the REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT–FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL
COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS (2016), the
President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology states:
[C]urrent studies have adequately explored only a limited range of mixture types (with
respect to number of contributors, ratio of minor contributors, and total amount of
DNA).  The two most widely used methods (STRMix and TrueAllele) appear to be
reliable within a certain range, based on the available evidence and the inherent diffi-
culty of the problem.  Specifically, these methods appear to be reliable for three-person
mixtures in which the minor contributor constitutes at least 20 percent of the intact
DNA in the mixture and in which the DNA amount exceeds the minimum level re-
quired for the method.
Id. at 80.
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testing devices often noted that the manufacturer involved in the case
had asserted the privilege protecting its trade secret.200  The courts
reasoned that defendants could not obtain discovery from the govern-
ment because the government did not own or possess the code and
that the defendant could not have discovery from the manufacturer
due to the privilege.201  In the second wave of case law involving
TrueAllele, Cybergenetics similarly persuaded the courts that the priv-
ilege for its trade secrets trumps the defendant’s discovery interests.202
Admittedly, a manufacturer that has invested time and money in
the development of trade secret information has a legitimate interest
in safeguarding its investment.203  If the information is publicly circu-
lated and copied, the company can lose licensing revenue.204  If the
software in question is one of the company’s most valuable assets, the
result might be the bankruptcy of the company.  It is estimated that
the theft of intellectual property costs American businesses $300 bil-
lion annually.205  The protection of trade secrets is such a vital na-
tional interest that in 1996, Congress enacted the Economic
Espionage Act,206 criminalizing the theft of trade secrets.207  Since the
problem persisted, Congress passed the Theft of Trade Secrets Clarifi-
cation Act of 2012.208  The Advisory Committee that proposed the
Federal Rules of Evidence included draft Rule 508 which would have
codified a privilege for trade secrets.209  Although Congress balked at
enacting the draft rule, many states have done so; regardless, the fed-
eral courts have recognized the privilege by common-law process
under Federal Rule 501.210
200. See, e.g., Moe v. State, 944 So. 2d 1096, 1097 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); People v. Robin-
son, 860 N.Y.S.2d 159, 167 (App. Div. 2008); State v. Burnell, 2007 WL 241230, at *2 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Jan. 18, 2007); People v. Cialino, 831 N.Y.S.2d 680, 681 (Crim. Ct. 2007).
201. See, e.g., Moe, 944 So. 2d at 1097; Robinson, 860 N.Y.S.2d at 161; Burnell, 2007 WL
241230, at *2; Cialino, 831 N.Y.S.2d at 681.
202. David Kravets, Secret Source Code Pronounces You Guilty as Charged, ARS TECHNICA
(Oct. 17, 2015, 7:00 AM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/10/secret-source-code-pro-
nounces-you-guilty-as-charged; Palazzolo, supra note 27.  In Commonwealth v. Robinson, the R
court tersely commented that “[t]his source code is the intellectual property of Cybergenetics.”
No. CC 201307777, at *1 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Allegeheny Cty. Feb. 4, 2016).
203. Mislow, supra note 12, at 40–41 (discussing research and development costs). R
204. Id. at 41.
205. Rachel Glas, Trade-Secret Cases Abound in California, CAL. LAW., May 2011, at 6.
206. Pub. L. 104-294, 110 Stat. 3488 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–1839 (2012)).
207. 18 U.S.C. § 1831; Joseph F. Savage, Jr. et al., Trade Secrets: Conflicting Views of the
Economic Espionage Act, CRIM. JUST. MAG., Fall 2000, at 11.
208. Theft of Trade Secrets Clarification Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-236, 126 Stat. 1627
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–1839 (2012)).
209. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE, supra note 101, at 1456. R
210. Id.
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Although companies like CMI and Cybergenetics have a perfect
right to assert the evidentiary privilege for their trade secrets, their
assertion of the right should not end the analysis.  Under statute and
at common law, it is well-settled that the privilege is conditional or
qualified one.211  Draft Federal Rule of Evidence 508 expressly de-
scribed the privilege as “qualified.”212  A party seeking discovery of
the trade secret information can defeat the privilege claim by demon-
strating that the information is highly relevant and necessary for
trial.213
While a judge might assign considerable weight to the company’s
interest in safeguarding its trade secrets, she can take steps to reduce
the risks posed by the disclosure of the information during pretrial
discovery.  The second sentence of draft Rule 508 read: “When disclo-
sure is directed, the judge shall take such protective measures as the
interests of the holder of the privilege and of the parties and the fur-
therance of justice may require.”214  In civil cases, courts have issued
the following protective orders, inter alia: The opposing party’s ex-
perts could examine the trade secret information only in a secure
room;215 to gain access to the secure room, the experts had to identify
themselves by iris and palm-print scans;216 during their examination of
the information, the experts had to use paper bearing tags emitting
radio waves to determine how many pages of notes the experts had
used;217 counsel and the experts had to sign declarations that they
would access the data only for use in the present litigation;218 and the
trial courtroom would be closed to the public during any testimony
discussing the trade secret information.219  Some commentators gener-
alize that when the trade secret information is important enough in
the case, the civil courts almost always issue protective orders and re-
211. Farouk Systems, Inc. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 700 F. Supp. 2d 780, 788 (S.D. Tex.
2010); Davis v. Leal, 43 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1110 (E.D. Cal. 1999).
212. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE, supra note 101, at 1471 (quoting FED. R. EVID. R
508).
213. Bridgestone Ams. Holding Inc. v. Mayberry, 878 N.E.2d 189, 195 (Ind. 2007).  There is
necessity if the party seeking discovery cannot obtain equivalent information through reasonably
available means.
214. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE, supra note 101, at 1471. R





218. Bernier v. One World Techs., Inc., 746 F. Supp. 2d 240, 244–45 (D. Mass. 2010).
219. Peter Page, Tire Trial Tactic: Clear the Courtroom, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 29, 2002, at A4; see
also Foster & Northrop, supra note 35, at 45 (describing protective orders for keeping source R
code confidential during discovery and trial).
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quire disclosure.220  One court has observed that in civil practice, the
real rule is that when a party seeking discovery has a genuine need for
trade secret information, the technically privileged information is dis-
coverable under protective order.221
The courts have also required disclosure subject to protective order
in criminal cases.222  As previously stated, the theft of trade secrets is
now a federal crime.223  In a prosecution, the defense might contend
that the information in question does not qualify as a trade secret
under federal law.  To press that contention, a defendant may seek
discovery of the content of the alleged trade secret.  As in civil cases,
criminal courts have balanced the competing interests—the accused’s
need for information and the trade owner’s legitimate interest in safe-
guarding the information—by issuing protective orders.  The courts
have entered pretrial pre-indictment protective orders, pretrial post-
indictment orders, and trial orders.224  As in civil cases, courts have
crafted myriad of orders, including pretrial provisions that: the experts
to be granted access undergo certain vetting; the experts sign a decla-
ration acknowledging their obligation not to circulate the information;
the expert be allowed to study the information only in secure areas;
the experts be obliged to conduct their analysis on protected com-
puters; and the experts be required to return or destroy all notes as
soon as the investigation or prosecution terminates.225  At trial, judges
have given jurors special instructions about their obligation not to dis-
close trade secrets discussed during testimony in open court and en-
tered orders dealing with such matters as the redaction of trial
exhibits, the filing of exhibits under seal, and the closure of the court-
room during testimony mentioning the trade secrets.226
Given these precedents, the assertion of a trade secret privilege by
companies, such as CMI and Cybergenetics, should not bar pretrial
discovery.  In published civil opinions, courts have sometimes ordered
disclosure to counsel representing, or experts hired by, litigants with
economic interests directly adverse to those of the owner of the trade
220. 26 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE § 5650 (2d ed. 1992) (“[O]nce necessity is shown, the courts will almost always order
disclosure.”).
221. La Chemise Lacoste v. General Mills, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 596, 605 (D. Del. 1971), aff’d, 487
F.2d 312 (3d Cir. 1973).
222. See Brian L. Levine & Timothy C. Flowers, Your Secrets Are Safe with Us: How Prosecu-
tors Protect Trade Secrets During Investigation and Prosecution, 38 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 461
(2015).
223. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–1839 (2012) (criminalizing theft of trade secrets).
224. Levine & Flowers, supra note 222, at 480–81. R
225. Id. at 481.
226. Id. at 481–82.
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secret.227  In that setting, the risk of wrongful disclosure is at its high-
est.  The court is ordering divulgence to a litigant or expert hired by a
litigant who is the owner’s actual or potential economic competitor—
someone with the greatest temptation to misuse the information to
the owner’s detriment.228  In sharp contrast, in the typical case in
which the court orders disclosure to an accused challenging an auto-
mated forensic science technique, the risk is much smaller.  The ac-
cused is not an economic competitor of the owner.  The defense’s only
interest is using the trade secret information in the pending litigation
to raise doubts about the reliability of the computerized technique.  If
protective orders suffice to protect the owner’s interests in cases or-
dering disclosure to the owner’s business rivals, there is all the more
reason to mandate disclosure here.
3. A Proposal for Balancing the Defense’s Need for Access Against
the Countervailing Considerations
Some might suggest that the court should automatically order dis-
covery of the source code whenever an expert relies on an automated
technique.  However, this Article advances a much less sweeping
claim.  Faced with competing legitimate interests, a trial judge must
attempt to strike a rational balance.  In this context, the judge could
do so by proceeding in two steps.  First, a judge should assign to the
accused seeking discovery the burden of showing that the facts of the
instant prosecution exceed, or are at the margins of, the validation
range of the empirical studies relied on by the prosecution.  More spe-
cifically, the defendant must convince the judge that the available
studies do not adequately address the effect of a specified, material
variable or condition present in the instant case.  The most clear-cut
case would be a fact situation in which none of the available studies
relied on by the prosecution experts tested the application of the tech-
nique to fact situations involving the condition.
The judge should certainly not accept the ipse dixit assertion of the
defense counsel that the omitted condition is material in the sense that
its presence could affect the outcome of the test.  After all, the de-
fense counsel is not a scientist.  Rather, the judge ought to demand
that the defense present expert testimony explaining why it is plausi-
ble that that condition could change the test result.  In modern DNA
typing, analysts evaluate the peaks on electropherograms to identify
the alleles present in a sample.229  The height of the peaks is measured
227. Id. at 481.
228. Id. at 480–81.
229. 2 GIANNELLI ET AL., supra note 5, § 18.04[b][2]. R
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in relative fluorescent units.230  In mixed samples, the peak reflecting
one contributor’s DNA marker at a site might be thirty units in height
while those reflecting another contributor’s profile could be twice as
tall.231  Suppose that in the case of computer software such as TrueAl-
lele, the prosecution’s expert relied on validation studies in which
there was at most a 3:1 ratio between the height of the peak attributa-
ble to the largest contributor and that attributable to the smallest con-
tributor.  In the instant case, the disparity ratio was 5:1.  The judge
should not accept at face value the defense counsel’s claim that the
difference between a 3:1 ratio in the studies and a 5:1 ratio in the
pending case invalidates the extrapolation from the studies to the
opinion that the technique can be reliably applied in the pending case.
Instead, the judge ought to insist that the defense produce an expert232
explaining why that difference could plausibly impact the outcome of
the analysis.  Unless the defense could do so, the judge ought to deny
the defense discovery request.
Assume that in the first step, the judge concludes that the defense
has met its burden.  Even then the judge should not automatically re-
quire the manufacturer to furnish the defense with a printout or elec-
tronic version of the source code.  Instead, the judge could give the
manufacturer a choice to: either (1) allow the defense to test the appli-
cation of the program to a fact situation including the material condi-
tion or variable omitted from the validation studies, or (2) provide the
defense with the source code.  At the first step in the analysis, the
defense criticized the empirical record on the ground that the valida-
tion studies conducted to date omit a material condition. Enabling a
defense expert to design and conduct a new validation study covering
that condition directly responds to such criticism.  Significantly,
Cybergenetics “has offered to let defense lawyers conduct their own
tests on the software to satisfy themselves of its reliability.”233  At the
end of this first step, the judge is not licensing a fishing expedition of
unlimited scope; rather, the judge is authorizing discovery designed to
meet a discrete defense criticism of the state of the empirical record in
order to determine whether the technique can be reliably applied to
the facts in the pending case.  By enabling the defense expert to con-
duct a new validation study testing that application,234 the manufac-
230. Id. § 18.04[b][1].
231. Id.
232. Of course, an indigent defendant may need to seek funds from the court to hire an expert
and cover the costs of testing. Id. §§ 4.03–4.05.
233. Palazzolo, supra note 27. R
234. Again, an indigent defendant might need to seek government funds to hire a defense
expert.  2 GIANNELLI ET AL., supra note 5, §§ 4.03–4.05. R
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turer would afford the defense expert a fair opportunity to investigate
the merit of the criticism.
If, for some reason, the manufacturer rejected the first option, the
judge could then order the manufacturer to grant the defense access
to the source code itself.235  Since the code usually embodies the man-
ufacturer’s trade secret, presumably the manufacturer would choose
the first option.  Either option, though, would suffice to enable the
defense to reasonably determine whether the inclusion of the addi-
tional condition could actually—not merely theoretically—affect the
outcome of the use of the automated forensic technique.
IV. CONCLUSION
Students of the criminal justice system have increasingly exposed
the dangers of reliance on eyewitness testimony236 and confession evi-
dence.237  To reduce its reliance on those suspect types of evidence,
the criminal justice system has turned to forensic science techniques.
Admittedly, there have been serious criticisms of the extent of the
validation of several of those techniques;238 however, forensic tech-
niques resting on solid validation promise to enhance the objectivity
and accuracy of the evidence on which criminal verdicts are based.
The justice system’s increasing reliance on forensic evidence has
placed growing demands on forensic laboratories.239  DNA testing is a
case in point.  In many jurisdictions, there are large backlogs of sam-
ples, including rape test kit samples, that have yet to be processed.240
The problem has reached such acute proportions that in 2000 Con-
235. The defense expert’s review could be a costly, time–consuming process. See Foster &
Northrop, supra note 35, at 42, 44–45 (explaining that there could be “millions of lines of code R
along with hundreds—if not thousands—of interconnected files,” and a thorough review of the
code could “take months”).
236. 2 GIANELLI ET AL., supra note 5, § 9.02 (discussing the weaknesses in lay eyewitness R
testimony).
237. Id. § 9.09 (discussing false confessions and the weaknesses in confession evidence).
238. See generally NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED
STATES: A PATH FORWARD 100 (2009) (explaining DNA analysis is the only “forensic method”
that “has been rigorously shown to have the capacity to consistently, and with a high degree of
certainty, demonstrate a connection between an evidentiary sample and a specific individual or
source”).
239. Dawson, supra note 11, at 10. R
240. ANDRE A. MOENSSENS ET AL., SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES
§ 17.14 (5th ed. 2007) (“[O]ne major hurdle left to be resolved is the backlog of cases waiting to
be analyzed” and “[w]ith the increased submissions of DNA samples,” the system can be
“overwhelmed”).
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gress felt compelled to pass the DNA Backlog Elimination Act241 to
provide additional funding to reduce the backlog.242
In both the public and private sectors, the response to backlog is
often technological automation.243  One of the major breakthroughs in
the history of fingerprint examination was the advent of automated
fingerprint identification systems which dramatically shortened the
time required for a fingerprint analysis by eliminating the need for
time-consuming manual sorting and classification of prints.244  Of
course, eventually DNA typing replaced fingerprinting as the “gold
standard” of forensic science.  Initially DNA analyses were conducted
manually, but today most laboratories in the United States utilize au-
tomated Applied Biosystems instrumentation or similar equipment.245
When it became evident that one of the greatest challenges in DNA
analysis was the evaluation of mixed samples, Cybergenetics devel-
oped another level of automation, namely, TrueAllele software.246  As
we have seen, the key to automation is the development of source
code.247  There cannot be automation without some form of source
code.248
The hope is that increasing automation of forensic science tech-
niques, such as infrared breath testing and the assessment of mixed
DNA samples, will not only increase the efficiency of forensic labora-
tories but also enhance the accuracy of the forensic analyses intro-
duced in court.  In its 2016 report on forensic science, the President’s
Council of Advisors on Science and Technology asserts that the ad-
vent of “probabilistic genotyping software programs clearly re-
present[s] a major improvement over” the subjective methods of
analyzing complex mixtures that have been employed in the past.249
That hope can be realized only if the source code for automated tech-
niques is reliable.  There are ways of indirectly gauging the reliability
241. Pub. L. No. 106-546, 114 Stat. 2726 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14135 (2012)).  In
enacting the DNA Backlog Elimination Act, Congress made an explicit legislative finding that
there is “a nationwide backlog of DNA samples from . . . crime scenes that need to be tested.”
Id. § 14135.
242. Id. § 14135.
243. Harman, supra note 1. R
244. MOENSSENS ET AL., supra note 240, § 10.06. R
245. William Thompson & Daniel Krane, DNA in the Courtroom, in PSYCHOLOGICAL AND
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL TRIALS § 11:23 (2003) (noting 85% of American DNA labo-
ratories employ such automation).
246. See Moss, supra note 23, at 1059. R
247. Harman, supra note 1, at 3. R
248. Id.
249. PRES. COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT – FORENSIC
SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF FEATURE-COMPARISON
METHODS 79 (2016), http://pceinc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Report-to-President.pdf.
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of the source code without directly examining the code itself.  Empiri-
cal studies can provide a circumstantial assurance of the analyses’
trustworthiness so long as the application of the technique in the case
falls within the validation range established by studies.  When the con-
ditions of the case are beyond, or at the edges of, the validation range,
courts should grant the defense pretrial discovery to investigate
whether the omitted condition could change the outcome of the auto-
mated test.  The discovery can take the form of either the disclosure of
the source code, or according to defendants an opportunity to conduct
a new validation test covering the omitted condition.  Until courts
guarantee the defense that right, source code will continue to be a
source of controversy and doubt about the marked trend toward the
automation of forensic analysis in the United States.
